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ChaebOl and Korea's Industrial Finance
Murat Doral and Michael Patrono
The Korean economy is based on a government led and export oriented growth
model centered on business groups or conglomerates known as chaebols which have
close relationships with the government. The government led growth model, also
known as Guided or Managed Capitalism, relies on a government dominated, but
privately owned, business sector. The private business sector is itself dominated by
chaebols which are family owned or controlled business groups. These groups are
supported by preferential relationships with the government. While the chaebOl system
was an important element of South Korea's early industrial growth, it ultimately had to
be reformed. The access to cheap and easy credit as well as protected domestic markets
led many chaebols to make poor investment decisions. The weaknesses of the chaebOls
became apparent during the Asian financial crisis. Many of them collapsed in a short
period of time because they were heavily invested in export-oriented industries, and
thus exposed to the risk of a downturn in foreign markets.
Introduction
The South Korean economy is based on an export led growth model
centered on business groups or conglomerates known as chaeb6ls. The chaeb6ls
are themselves modeled on the Japanese system of keiretsu, but with homegrown
modifications. In this paper we will examine the impact of chaeb6ls on the
economic growth of South Korea from the end of World War II until the end of
the 1990's.
South Korea's government led growth model, also known as Guided or
Managed Capitalism, relies on a government dominated, but privately owned,
business sector. The private business sector is itself dominated by chaeb6ls which
are family owned or controlled business groups. These groups are supported by
preferential relationships with the government. These relationships give
government control over the allocation of financial resources which are used to
direct firms into specific areas of industry that the government has identified as
areas of competitive strength. Through control of the banking system the
government encourages private investment in industry by granting easy and
cheap access to capital, as well as control over imports that compete with the
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chaebols in the Korean domestic market. In return for this government provided
support the owners of the chaebols agree to make large investments in, and
expand production of goods for the export market. By means of this strong
government steering of access to credit, South Korea made an initial place for
itself among the major industrialized countries of the world.
While the chaebol system was an important element of South Korea's early
industrial growth, it ultimately had to be reformed. The access to cheap and easy
credit as well as protected domestic markets led many chaebOls to make poor
investment decisions. The weaknesses of the chaebOls became apparent during
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Many companies collapsed in a short period of
time because they were heavily invested in export-oriented industries, and thus
exposed to the risk of a downturn in foreign markets. In the name of expansion
they built up excess production capacities under the protection of the
government.
Following the Asian financial crisis, South Korean government leaders
insisted that Korean chaebOls look to the outside world for growth, but without
government help or protection. This free-market orientation put Korea and the
chaebols in an arena much larger than the national market, and put success
sufficiently outside the control of domestic politicians that the firms had to adopt
competitive market strategies to survive and prosper. While the government
provided support, such as cheap credit and domestic market protection, helped at
an early stage of development, growth is ultimately independent of government
help. Success or failure is determined by response to competitive pressures in
global markets based on comparative advantage. In this new era Korea's success
is the result of an emphasis on market competition, investment in new
technologies and human capital, and a reduction in government protection of the
chaebOls.
South Korean Economic Development
The case of South Korea, while not unique, is an impressively instructive
example of a country that followed a different path from the one pursued by most
developing nations after World War II. Several countries in the East Asia.
commonly known as the "Asian Tigers", also embarked on a predominantly
market led growth path. South Korea, the most prominent of the Tigers, is
especially interesting considering the daunting obstacles that had to be overcome,
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the speed at which the country developed, and the degree to which the country
has reached full development on par with the West.
Like many other developing economies during the 1960's, South Korea initially
adopted the government led growth model to jump-start rapid industrialization,
though with some significant differences. First, the South Korean government
pushed for the private sector to invest in targeted industries rather than building
a state owned sector as India did. To that end, the government provided the
means of financing and market protection. Second, unlike many developing
nations, the government adopted an export orientation as part of their economic
policy. Instead of focusing on the smaller domestic market, South Koreans
decided to go head to head with the companies in the more advanced economies
in global markets, and despite all the troubles and turmoil this engendered they
modernized their economy and society in a single generation (see Table 1).
Table 1: Sectoral Composition as a percent of GOP
2009-2010 Agriculture Industry Services
South Korea 3% 39% 58%
Argentina 9% 33% 57%
Turkey 9% 28% 63%
Brazil 6% 29% 66%
India 18% 29% 52%
Source: World Economic Forum - World Competitiveness Report 2009-2010, (p. 55).
South Korea is a country located in East Asia and neighbored by China to
the west, Japan to the east, and North Korea to the north. Its territory covers a
total area of 38,502 square miles (smaller than the state of Georgia) and has a
population of over 48 million (close to 25% larger than California), making it the
one of the most densely populated countries in the world (See Table 2).
Table 2: Korea and United States
Population Surface Area Popu]ation/Sq.Mi.
United States 310,232,863 3,794,099 81.77
South Korea 48,636,068 38,502 1263.21
Source: Retrieved from the CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-
world-factbook/
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In recent history, South Korea achieved and sustained high rates of
economic growth despite the fact that it is under constant threat by North Korea
across the 38th parallel. It has been particularly successful in modernizing its
economy and bringing prosperity to its citizens at a much larger scale compared
to other Asian Tiger economies. In fact, through this rapid growth, South Korea
has been able to transform itself into a highly sophisticated, knowledge based,
industrialized, and competitive export economy.
According to rankings published by the World Economic Forum, South
Korea has several competitive strengths such as a world class infrastructure,
strong macroeconomic policy, an excellent educational system, and an innovative
spirit, making South Korea a global competitor to be reckoned with. However, it
has several weaknesses as well, which are mostly related to public sector
inefficiencies and its institutional framework. These weaknesses include labor
market rigidity, a fragile banking sector, institutional quality issues, mistrust of
politicians, and government red tape (See Table 3).




Strong macroeconomic stability 11 th
An excellent higher educational system 16th
One of the world's innovation powerhouses 11th
Weaknesses
Labor market flexibility 118th
Financial market, particularly the banking sector 90th
Quality of its institutions 53rd
Mediocre level of trust in politicians 67th
The perceived opacity of policymaking 100th
The burden of red tape 98th
Source: World Economic Forum - World Competitiveness Report 2009-2010. (p. 29).
How was it possible for a crowded Asian country with very limited natural
resources to achieve such economic success and move from an agricultural based
economy to a high tech, knowledge-based economy in a single generation? Even
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though the answer is multi-faceted, there is one important factor that separated
South Korea from most developing nations: the adoption of market-friendly
economic policies and the adoption of an "outward looking" export orientation.
After World War II, while most of the world was moving away from the market
system and capitalism and toward the command system and socialism, South
Korea, along with a handful of other East Asian countries, took the chance and
moved in the opposite direction. Even though its policy makers initially relied on
the guiding hand of the government and continually intervened through trade
barriers and credit allocation, South Korea's policy makers promoted aggressive
competition in export markets. Like other Asian Tigers, South Korea had
business and market friendly governments who got the economic fundamentals
right with high domestic savings rates, low inflation, export orientation, and
emphasis and commitment to education (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 141).
This choice of market orientation was by no means foreordained. Right
from the founding of modern Korea there were powerful political currents
moving in the opposite direction. The modern nations of North and South
Korea, which had previously been annexed by Japan since 1910, were formed on
the Korean peninsula after World War II. The Korean War, which lasted for
three years from 1950 until 1953, further solidified the two nations into hostile
camps. The division of Korea not only separated the Korean people into two
separate countries but also created two very different economic systems. North
Korea became a communist dictatorship while South Korea eventually became a
democracy with a capitalist based economy. In addition, in 1945 when the
Korean peninsula was partitioned, the South had been left with very little
industry since the north had historically been the most heavily industrialized part
of the peninsula (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 151).
While North Korea adopted a centrally planned command economic system
under communism, South Korea adopted a market based economic system under
American tutelage. Today, 56 years after the end of the War, South Korea is a
newly industrialized economy that can compete successfully on a global scale
with the companies of more advanced countries. On the other hand, North Korea
has a closed economy, is a suppressive dictatorship, and its population suffers
from very low standards ofliving (See Table 4).
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Table 4: Korea's GDP
2008 Population GDP-PPP GDP per Capita
South Korea 48.6m. $1,467 b. (2010) $30,200 (2010)
North Korea 22.8m. $40b. (2009) $1,800 (2009)
2008 Agriculture Industry Services
South Korea 3% 39.5% 57.6%
North Korea 23.3% 43.1% 33.6%
Source: Retrieved from CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbookl
The real push for development and industrialization came in 1961, when
. Army General Park Chung Hee took power through a military coup. Despite
having suffered significantly under Japanese colonialism from 1910 until the end
of World War II, Park modeled the Korean economy on the Japanese model of
export orientation. The Korean model which came to be known later as "the
Economic Miracle on the Han River" was a combination of government
intervention and market economics with a focus on heavy industrialization and
export-led economic growth. This was mainly done for two reasons: export
orientation was chosen to offset the effects of declining American aid, and heavy
industrialization to counter the much stronger North Korean military machine
(Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, pp. 152-153). The primary engine of economic growth
became exports, a strategy that was due to the lack of land resources, a limited
domestic market, and a well educated workforce. To this end, chaebols became
the tools of this export-oriented and outward looking industrialization strategy as
a way to achieve rapid growth and prosperity.
Chaeb61s
The creation of chaebOls, family controlled but government assisted
conglomerates or corporate groups, came later when economic policy makers
realized that in order for the Korean companies to compete on the global stage
for export earnings large firms had to be created. The chaebols came to dominate
the Korean economy and are the main export generating global competitors. The
chaebOls were modeled after Japanese keiretsu, but with significant differences:
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1. The most important difference between the Japanese keiretsu and Korean
chaebOls is that while a keiretsu was organized around a commercial bank,
chaebOls were prohibited from forming and owning banks.
2. While chaebOls are still largely controlled by their founding families,
Japanese keiretsus are controlled by professional managers. Therefore, chaebOls
have a more centralized structure but keiretsus are more decentralized.
3. Chaebols often rely on their own subsidiaries to produce components, but
keiretsus frequently use sub-contractors. The chaebol model is based on a
complex and intricate system of interlocking ownerships. In many cases, the
owners of a chaebol, along with family members, and even senior managers from
their subsidiaries, control several businesses which may control other businesses
that control the subsidiaries.
In the 1960's, the Park regime had nationalized the banks in South Korea in
order to control the allocation of credit to favored industries and firms. The
government had granted chaebols access to easy and cheap credit and privileges.
In many cases, certain chaebols grew not because they were efficient and
profitable but because of this access. The weaknesses of some of the chaebols
became apparent during the Asian financial crisis of 1999 when many of them
did not generate enough cash flow to pay their debts and went bankrupt.
Following the assassination of President Park in 1979 by the head of the
Korean Intelligence Agency, yet another army general, Chun Doo Hwan, came to
power and immediately set out to stabilize the country. With the help of Stanford
trained economist Kim Jae-Ik, South Korea rapidly changed course in terms of
economics and politics. Over time and despite massive government help, the
chaebols had grown inefficient and could not survive without government
subsidies or even bailouts. Kim's suggestion was to reduce the size and scope of
government intervention by pulling back the economic frontier of the state from
the economy (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 151). Subsequently, South Korea
never looked back and adopted economic policies aimed at less interventionist
indicative planning, sold off some government owned enterprises, deregulating
the financial sector, and reduced import barriers to expose the chaebols to greater
competition (Yergin & Stanislaw, 2002, p. 155).
Through significant government support and competitive strengths
acquired over time, some of the chaebols such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and
others became household names around the world (See Table 4). In fact,
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Samsung alone is responsible for about 20% of South Korea's exports. Moreover,
Samsung Electronics is the world's largest electronics company, the largest
producer of memory chips, and second-largest chipmaker. Samsung Heavy
Industries is also the world's second largest shipbuilder, and Samsung C&T is a
well-known construction company with a significant global presence. On the
other hand, Hyundai Motors is the world's fourth largest automaker after Toyota,
GM, and Volkswagen in terms of unit sales and fifth in terms of dollar sales. Also,
Hyundai Heavy Industries is the world's largest shipbuilder. The third biggest
chaebol, LG Group, is also a dominant global competitor in a number of key
markets. For example, Samsung and LG together produce 50% of the world's
LCD televisions. Also, LG is the world's second largest manufacturer ofTVs and
third largest manufacturer of mobile phones.
Despite the fact that chaebOls make an enormous contribution to the South
Korean economy and provide employment opportunities, many of them, instead
of focusing on their core competencies, run and operate unrelated businesses and
many of their subsidiaries and affiliates are not profitable (See Table 4).
Conclusion
Regardless of the deficiencies of the chaebOls, and the over dependence on
export markets, today South Korea is a parliamentary democracy and has a
dynamic capitalist economy which is ranked as the 13th largest economy in the
world (CIA World Factbook, 2010). From the early 1960's until the 1997 crisis,
the South Korean economy has been one of the fastest growing economies in the
world (see Table 5). In just more than three decades, this rapid and sustained
growth pushed South Korea from the ranks of the poorest countries in the world
into the ranks of major industrialized countries of the world. The key to the
South Korean success was the adoption of outward looking economic and
development policies, large investments in education and human capital, and a
willingness to adapt and reform to remain competitive in the global economy.
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Table 4: Korean Corporations
2009 Global Revenues Profits Profit Margin Assets Eauity
500 Rank r$ millions) r$ millions) r%) r$ millions) r$ millions)
Samsung
1 Electronics 32 $108,927 $5,027 4.56% $83,601 $46,141
2 LG Group 67 $78,892 $830 1.01% $51,433 $4,948
3 SK Holdinl?;s 72 $80,810 $259 0.32% $55,499 $5,373
Hyundai Motor
4 Corporation 87 $72,542 $780 1.08% $81,938 $15,140
5 POSCO 199 $37,976 $3,984 10.49% $37,284 $21,963
6 GS Holdings 213 $36,503 $102 0.28% $18,348 $2,818
Korea Electric
7 Power 305 $28,712 -$2,689 -9.36% $70,024 $32,521
Hyundai Heavy
8 Industries 355 $25,004 $2,051 8.20% $30,469 $4,507
9 Hanwha 362 $24,782 $267 1.08% $55,257 $1,366
Samsung Life
10 Insurance 367 $24,420 $93 0.38% $87,957 $5,372
11 Korea Gas 438 $21,076 $301 1.43% $17,421 $3,238
12 S-Oil 441 $21,020 $406 1.93% $6,119 $2,694
13 Doosan 471 $19,494 $98 0.50% $26,035 $1,228
14 Samsunl?; C&T 495 $18,635 $315 1.69% $12,260 $3,887
$603,406 $11,824 1.96% $633,645 $151,194
Source: Retrieved from CNNMoney.com/FORTUNE - Annual Rankings of the World's Largest
Corporations.
http://money.cnn.com/magazinesl fortunel giobalSOO/20 101cou n tries/Sou thKorea.h tml
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Table 5: Economic Growth Indicators for South Korea
S. Korea GDp·PPP Exports Imports Trade Balance Trade Volume
1988 $
383.164.64 $ 72,996.13 $ 67.399.61 $ 5,596.52 $ 140,395.74
1989 $
409.007.12 $ 70,096.16 $ 77,216.48 $ (7,120.32) $ 147,312.64
1990 $
446,452.62 $ 73,217.59 $ 87,209.90 $ (13,992.31) $ 160,427.49
1991 $
488.388.59 $ 81,325.13 $ 103,705.20 $ (22,380.07) $ 185,030.32
1992 $
517.084.80 $ 91,250.88 $ 107.783.47 $ (16,532.59) $ 199,034.35
1993 $
548.801.53 $ 102.341.65 $ 113.615.99 $ (11,274.34) $ 215,957.64
1994 $
595,650.21 $119.003.59 $137.914.41 $ (18,910.82) $ 256,918.00
1995 $
650,265.05 $ 148,022.89 $ 167,778.73 $ (19,755.84) $ 315,801.61
1996 $
695.774.77 $ 166.029.87 $ 190.860.37 $ (24,830.50) $ 356,890.25
1997 $
728.134.81 $ 201.935.96 $ 196.880.07 $ 5,055.90 $ 398.816.03
1998 $
678,225.10 $ 227,485.33 $ 148.101.21 $ 79.384.12 $ 375.586.54
1999 $
742,563.73 $ 260,747.79 $196,607.91 $ 64.139.87 $ 457.355.70
2000 $
805,578.99 $ 310,665.04 $ 238,153.10 $ 72,511.94 $ 548.818.15
2001 $
837,588.38 $ 300,021.02 $ 223,158.46 $ 76,862.56 $ 523.179.49
2002 $
897,476.10 $ 336,316.77 $ 256,712.84 $ 79,603.93 $ 593,029.61
2003 $
922,630.35 $ 385,025.48 $ 289.281.60 $ 95,743.89 $ 674,307.08
2004 $
965,246.96 $ 461,038.30 $ 321,648.84 $ 139,389.46 $ 782,687.14
2005 $
1,003,443.26 $ 496,864.48 $ 345.114.32 $ 151.750.16 $ 841,978.79
2006 $
1,055.408.31 $ 553,339.76 $ 384,852.67 $ 168,487.09 $ 938,192.43
2007 $ $
1.109.295.72 $ 623,090.83 $ 426,710.62 $196,380.21 1,049,801.45
2008
$1,133,965.44 $658,814.92 $ 446,307.67 $ 212,507.25 $1,105,122.60
Growth
Rate 5.57% 11.63% 9.91% 10.87%
Source: Retrieved from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development -
OECD.StatExtracts - 2008. http://stats.oecd.orgllndex.aspx
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